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Abstract1
Critical discourse analysis, the way I see it, is predicated upon the 
premise that discourse is not merely about a language-external reality, but 
is a means of critically intervening in that very reality.
a major challenge to the interventionist thesis is the idea of “self-
fashioning”, enthusiastically endorsed by contemporary neo-progmatists 
for whom all talk of language impinging  on reality is useless philosophical 
golbbledygook. The pragmatist rejection of language as representation 
leaves no room for any critical intervention. The question I would like to 
pose is: Is there anything in the notion of self-fashionning that can still be 
salvaged and grafted on to the project of Cda?
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Critical discourse analysis (Cda), the way I see it, is predicated 
upon the key premise that discourse is not merely about a language-external 
reality, but is a means of critically intervening in that very reality. What 
makes it critical is, in other words, the conviction on the part of those 
who subscribe to its basic tenets that there is no reason why the analysis of 
discourse should be confined to merely describing how things are, or for 
that matter, to speculating as to how things could be but unfortunately are 
not. Critical discourse analysts proceed on the assumption that language 
matters on its own and is not, as a certain time-honoured tradition would 
have it, the next best thing to the unrealisable dream of telepathy, the 
coveted faculty whereby language-independent meanings (intentions) are 
teletransported to other minds without the need of language functioning 
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as an intermediary (the dream that has, through the ages, impelled most 
attempts at theorising about language which, as a result, turn out to be, in 
the final analysis, elaborate exercises in self-pity – as if they were all saying 
in effect: “how sad that we humans are not endowed with the faculty of 
telepathy”). 
an important question that inevitably crops up is: how can our 
discursive practices be viewed as actually impinging on the reality “out 
there,” if that reality is admitted in the first place to be totally external 
to (i.e. not in actual contact with) language? That is to say, so long as 
language and reality are seen as made up of completely different material, 
all talk of the two ever coming into direct contact with each other (let 
alone the idea of one actually intervening in and influencing the other) 
must eo ipso be considered suspect. The question is perfectly in order as 
far as it goes. What may not withstand incisive probing is the standard 
assumption that the only reality that we are entitled to talk about here 
is the one manifested (represented?) by the putatively existent world of 
alethic truth. It seems to me that postmodernists and neo-pragmatists are 
not alone among contemporary theorists in their complete disillusionment 
with such philosophical mare’s nests. as Pierre bourdieu (1988: 774-5) 
wrote a decade ago: 
“Social science must break with the preconstructions of 
common sense, that is, with “reality” as it presents itself, 
in order to construct its proper objects, even at the risk of 
appearing to do violence to that reality, to tailor the ‘data’ 
to meet the requirements of scientific construction ...” 
The full significance of bourdieu’s insightful remark can only be 
appreciated, I would argue, if we bear in mind that the so-called “pre-
constructions of the common sense” are themselves the product of past 
theorisations. Common sense, as well as the ordinary language in which 
we standardly conduct our routine communicative transactions, typically 
carries vestigial traces of past and often outmoded theories - as evidenced 
by the continuing use of such expressions as ‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’ although 
70
Cadernos de Linguagem e Sociedade,  4, 2000
we have for long known that it is no longer fashionable to subscribe to 
the theory of geocentric universe that once validated those uses before 
Copernicus appeared on the scene. (cf. rajagopalan, 1998b). 
What is urgently needed if we still want to insist on the possibility of 
discourse analysis ever becoming genuinely critical in the relevant sense is 
to lay bare the ideological agenda that silently and surreptitiously informs 
the standard assumption that words are a far cry from deeds and can 
simply not be expected to make a difference the way deeds are deemed 
to. This standard assumption is what has prompted most of the summary 
dismissals of Cda as a viable research project. In a recent paper, Martyn 
hammersley sums up his scepticism concerning Cda’s pretensions in 
the following words: “ ... what is promised [by Cda] is some sort of 
comprehensive theory that will provide the basis for political action to 
bring about radical and emancipatory social change. above all, ‘critical’ 
approaches claim to unify theory and practice.” (hammersley, 1997: 238). 
Similar objections have also been brought forward by henry Widdowson 
(1995a, 1995b, 1996), for whom the very term “Critical discourse analysis” 
is a contradiction in terms because, in his view, nothing can be both 
critical and analytical simultaneously. If hammersley is saying that it is 
foolhardy to expect scientific theories to bring about social reforms on 
their own, Widdowson is saying that no scientific analysis can foreclose 
possible interpretation (or, rather, help us choose amongst the multiplicity 
of interpretations) of its results and, by implication, offer us useful and 
reliable tips for concrete action. For both hammersley and Widdowson, 
theories and analyses are what we do with words, so that they can at best 
make a difference in the realm of words. If, on the other hand, we want 
to make a difference in the world of reality “out there,” we had better 
come out of the ivory tower of theories and analyses and actually act upon 
the basis of those findings. both hammersley and Widdowson are thus 
convinced that Cda’s fundamental claims and hence its very raison d’être 
are suspect right from the start. In this paper, I do not intend to defend 
the central claims of Cda against those of its detractors who argue on the 
basis of their conviction that words can never affect the world of deeds, as 
I have already undertaken such a task elsewhere (cf. rajagopalan, 1995). 
now, the claims of Cda are also highly suspect from the perspective of 
71
Kanavillil rajagopalan
contemporary neo-pragmatists who insist that the whole issue has been 
rendered hopelessly muddled because of our having got used to talking 
about such matters in certain characteristic ways.   
a major challenge to the interventionist thesis (the idea, that is, that by 
speaking a language one is not merely describing a reality etc. but actually 
intervening in that very reality) that I have been advocating is the idea of 
“self-fashioning,” enthusiastically bandied about by the neo-pragmatists 
for whom all talk of language impinging on reality is useless philosophical 
gobbledygook. For pragmatists, especially those who follow the lead of rorty, 
the very idea that language represents a reality has only stood in the way of 
a clearer appreciation of what human language is all about. The important 
thing, they say, is to find alternative ways of conceptualising language, so 
that we will not find ourselves for ever having to solve vexed questions 
and intractable problems of our own making. on the face of it, then, the 
pragmatist rejection of language as representation leaves no room for any 
critical intervention whatsoever. Quite on the contrary, pragmatists seem to 
be advocating that the way we have got used to conceptualising language 
has been part of the very problem. Instead of hoping to set the reality right 
by “tinkering” with language, we should rather be attempting to change 
ourselves from within, bringing about the right changes in ourselves, so as 
to cope with that reality better. To quote rorty (1982: xix): 
“one can use language to criticize and enlarge itself, as 
one can exercise one’s body to develop and strengthen 
and enlarge itself, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole 
in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which 
it is a means to an end.” (emphasis added)
The question I would like to pose is: Is there anything in the notion 
of self-fashioning that can still be salvaged and grafted on to the project of 
Cda? In what follows, I shall attempt to make case for incorporating the 
notion of self-fashioning into the framework of Cda.
Perhaps the best way to approach the issue at hand is to start by 
considering what kind of arguments there might be that would make 
someone doubt that the whole attempt is doomed right from the very 
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beginning. In its strongest version, neo-pragmatism holds that the whole 
idea of regarding language as a “tertium quid” over and above the world 
of external reality and the human mind that seeks to comprehend it is a 
complete mistake. It is a mistake, the advocates of this doctrine would 
hasten to add, not because such a view fails to correspond to an actually 
existing state of affairs (for, if they did so argue, they would in effect be 
appealing to the very notion of correspondence which they are concerned 
to discredit). It is a mistake in the sense that it only creates more problems, 
more “headaches”, than alternative ways of visualising the picture. In other 
words, it is a crucial step in the pragmatist reasoning that new ideas are to 
be welcomed or rejected not because they are more or less accurate than 
the ones that we already operate with but because they either help us find 
our way about and make our lives better or, contrariwise, stand in the way 
of our “coping with” the reality.
If enabling us to cope with the reality better is what should count in 
choosing between alternative conceptual schemes, there might appear to be 
an excellent argument in the best pragmatist spirit in favour of not turning 
our backs on the notion of correspondence altogether. It is that the notion of 
correspondence and the idea that language represents a reality external to it 
may also hold the key to a better understanding of how linguistic interaction 
among speakers is, besides being a communicative activity, an activity shot 
through with political connotations. To begin with, it might help to notice 
that there is more than mere coincidence in the fact that the same word 
representation is also characteristically used in discussions of whether or 
to what extent a given form of government reflects the aspirations of the 
people on whose behalf it speaks and acts. In other words, it is my claim 
that representation is just as much a political matter as it is claimed to be 
a linguistic matter. or, if you will, linguistic representation is also a matter 
of political representation. and simultaneously so. 
It might be of some help detaining ourselves a little over the question 
of how the question of linguistic representation has an inalienable political 
dimension to it. recall that ancient greece, to which we usually trace back 
Man’s earliest ruminations about language in the western civilisation, 
was also – and, in fact, is in general more widely recognised to be so – 
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the cradle of democracy – the form of government considered the best 
and the most advanced. There is a clear parallel between the familiar 
theme (referred to at the outset of this paper) of electing transparency 
as the ideal of linguistic communication and the equally familiar idea 
that the athenian model of democracy was the purest form of that form 
of government. What is seldom recalled in this connection is that both 
cases are at bottom symptomatic of a certain ambivalent attitude towards 
the very notion of representation that has long marked our discussions. 
on the one hand, we wish (although this wish is hardly ever expressed 
in explicit terms) that we could do without representation. In the case of 
language, this could be achieved, if meanings could literally shuttle across 
human minds without the aid of language acting as a medium. at the 
level of political representation, the matter would be solved once and for 
all if the citizens could represent themselves, rather than having to elect 
someone else to represent them – as it is believed to have been the case in 
the ancient city-state of athens. (This is the reason why there is generally 
the sub-text that says that, after the great athenian experience where 
every citizen could –in principle – be physically present at the assembly 
meetings, further experiments in democracy elsewhere in the world have 
all been rather poor approximations to the putative perfection achieved 
by the original). after an early, inaugural stage of perfection – the adamic 
language of total one-to-one correspondence between the signifier and the 
signified and the athenian democracy marked by perfect identity between 
the representatives and those they represented – there has only been, alas, 
steady deterioration! 
What is important to recognise is that both cases attest to the 
impossibility of ever attaining perfect representation – in the case of 
language, because humans are not endowed with the faculty of telepathy; in 
the case of political representation, because even in the athens of the days 
yore, not everyone was represented in the legislative assembly –women 
and slaves, for instance, were simply not eligible to participate. It seems 
possible therefore to affirm that our theories of representation, whether 
linguistic or political, are equally predicated on the key idea (or, if you 
like, lamentation) that there is no such thing as perfect representation (cf. 
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rajagopalan, 1998a). now, in one sense this should not come as a matter 
of surprise. There would seem to be something semantically odd about 
the very idea of perfect representation, because insofar as representation 
can only be conceived of as involving two entities, one representing the 
other, perfect representation would require that we imagine an entity 
representing itself. but it so happens that we have a special word for that 
viz., “to present oneself” (as in a soldier’s “aye, aye, Sir!” in response to a 
routine roll-call). In other words, you don’t represent yourself; all you do 
is be simply present to look after your interests. (The apparent counter-
example of a defendant representing herself in a law suit fizzles out as soon 
as we consider that it is not the defendant herself who represents her, but 
the defendant qua her legally empowered attorney – who, under special 
circumstances may be allowed to be herself). 
To go back to the neo-pragmatists’ recommendationn that we abandon 
the notion of representation altogether, it should by now be fairly clear that 
an immediate consequence of adopting such a radical stance would be to de-
politicise language. as a matter of fact, this is just what rorty and other neo-
pragmatists have been exhorting that we undertake. Their plea is however 
based on their suspicion, unexceptionable in itself, that the whole idea of 
language representing an independent reality has only wrought confusion 
and led us into unnecessary intellectual quagmires at the level of metaphysics. 
There is no justification, they say, why we should cling to a metaphysics 
that has so far only bred endless confusion. Furthermore, if jettisoning the 
useless metaphysics inherited from our forefathers also involves foregoing 
an equally cumbersome ethic, then so be it. 
If, as the pragmatists insist time and time again, the ultimate criterion 
for retaining some form of thinking or trading it for another is how such 
a decision is going to affect our lives, or how the move is likely to help 
us “cope with” the world at large, there may indeed be some perfectly 
pragmatic reasons for not entirely sacrificing the notion of representation. 
after all, the idea of representation encapsulates an aesthetic (artistic, 
theatrical etc.) metaphor just as much as an ethical/political one. by 
retaining the metaphor, we may hope to salvage and improve upon what is 
still worth preserving from the long tradition of Western philosophy dating 
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back to the ancient greeks: that the ethical and the aesthetical can only 
be fully understood in conjunction with the epistemological. It is worth 
recalling at this stage that, in every one of these branches of philosophy, 
distinct conceptual spaces were carved out by having systematic recourse 
to well-rehearsed strategies of exclusion. In the words of Lacoue-Labarthe 
and nancy (1990: 297):
“It is known that Plato constructed the political (and, 
with the same gesture, delimited the philosophic as such) 
through the exclusion of myths – of the major art forms 
linked to them – from the pedagogy of the citizen and 
more generally from the symbolic space of the city.”
The new picture of language that will thus emerge by paying 
attention to the excess of metaphorical meaning present in the notion of 
representation may, I think, have important implications for Cda. 
The importance of the concept of “self-fashioning” for Cda 
begins to become apparent as soon as we recognise that ours is an 
age of crumbling identities. Concepts such as selfhood, nationhood, 
statehood, language, culture and so on are increasingly becoming 
fluid in a world-order marked by disappearing trade barriers and the 
free flow of information along satellite TVs and computer networks. 
Taylor (1992: 25ff) has argued that contemporary lived reality is a 
far cry from, say, that of the 18th century, thanks to the fact that the 
idea of a socially ascribed status based on a strict and pre-established 
hierarchy has yielded its place to that of selves that are uniquely 
constituted through self-awareness and self-reflection. The concept of 
individual — etymologically ‘a being that is undivided and indivisible’ – is 
no longer serviceable in our world populated by what gloria anzaldúa 
has called “mestiza identities” (anzaldúa, 1987; see also rajagopalan, 
forthcoming). In lieu of the old individuals, what we have today are selves 
that are constantly re-fashioning themselves in response to changing 
circumstances. Contingency rather than permanence and essence is the 
hall-mark of the selves in our post-industrial world-order (rorty, 1989). 
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Consequently, the opposition ‘the individual vs. the state’ stands in urgent 
need of re-theorisation. Perhaps one way of reconceptualizing the self in 
contemporary world scenario is to invoke the old greek notion of oikoV 
(oikos) – often translated as ‘home’ but perhaps better glossed as ‘hearth’. 
The difference between oikos and p´olhV (polis) was thus fundamentally 
a difference between the private and the public spheres. and the line of 
demarcation between the two was always a matter to be negotiated and 
indeed fought for, often against formidable odds (as dramatically brought 
out by Sophocles’ play Antigone) (cf rajagopalan, Ms). 
 In making the last claim, I am of course distancing myself from both 
the pragmatist recommendation that we keep the distinction between the 
private and the public intact and sacrosanct and the metaphysical tradition 
stretching back to Plato that consistently sought to subsume the two under 
some broader category. here is how rorty makes the point (rorty, 1989: 
120):
“Metaphysicians like Plato and Marx thought they could 
show that once philosophical theory has led us from 
appearance to reality we would be in a better position to 
be useful to our fellow human beings. They both hoped 
that the public-private split, the distinction between duty 
to self and duty to others, could be overcome.”
While agreeing with rorty’s criticism of earlier philosophers he 
dismissively limns as ‘metaphysicians’, I want nevertheless to resist 
the suggestion that we treat the distinction between the private and 
the public spheres as alone among the multitude of binary oppositions 
inherited from traditional philosophy fully immune to deconstruction. 
I want to pursue the third possibility that the two may turn out to 
be conceptually locked in an uneasy partnership, even dialectically 
opposed to each other, thus generating constant tensions, leading 
to renegotiations, and indeed creating the need for continually re-
fashioning oneself so as to enable oneself to better ‘cope with’ new 
challenges as they keep cropping up. This need to be constantly on 
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the alert is, it seems to me, part of what giddens has in mind when he 
introduces the term ‘life politics’. In his view,
“Life politics is a largely new domain of ethical debate, 
in which the old issue of classical philosophy “how 
shall I live?” becomes itself open to discourse, against 
the backdrop of transformations affecting nature, the 
self and the global community.” (giddens, 1993: 292)
 The utmost importance of the notion of “self-fashioning” for Cda 
can hardly be overestimated for the simple reason that it has to do with 
what may turn out to be the most distinguishing and salient trait of our 
times and one that is absolutely crucial if we wish to make sense of the 
new world order that seems to be emerging. 
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